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ABSTRACT
The problem of designing radiation tolerant systems
is crucial for modern physics. Reliable control system
able to operate in radiation environment are necessary
to carry out physics experiments. This paper highlights
the operating system, which is used to develop a soft-
ware fault tolerant environment for the reliable com-
puting. The main idea is to implement fault tolerant
algorithms into a kernel instead of user-space programs.
In this paper a new real-time kernel, called sCore, is
proposed. The sCore is a modern, multitasking kernel,
designed for real-time applications.
Keywords: Single Event Upset, Radiation Environ-
ment, Fault Tolerant System, Hardened, Real-Time Sys-
tem
1 BACKGROUND OF THE
RESEARCH
X-Ray Free Electron Laser (X-FEL) [1, 2], designed
at DESY Research Center in Hamburg, is the 4th gen-
eration of synchrotron accelerator [3, 4]. Total length
of the X-FEL will be 3.4 km with 2.1 km of accelerator
tunnel length. Distributed control system is necessary
to control all subsystems of X-FEL’s modules. Some
part of electronic equipment (DSP and FPGA boards,
embedded computers and microprocessors systems) de-
signed for control and data acquisition will be placed
inside accelerators tunnel close to cavities – the main
part of accelerator. During normal operation cavities
produce gamma and neutron radiation. Neutrons (espe-
cially slow called thermal neutrons) can affect memory
and registers in digital circuits and cause on illegal op-
eration and thus loss of the system functionality [5, 6].
Single memory malfunction is known as a Single Event
Upset (SEU) [7–9]. Microprocessor system placed in-
side the accelerator tunnel are subjected to neutron ra-
diation. To ensure reliable operation it is necessary to
protect digital circuits against radiation [10]. The sim-
ple way to protect control systems against SEU is to
use hardend computer systems designed for cosmic and
military application but keeping in mind total length of
the accelerator tunnel it will be too expensive for X-FEL
project. Other solution, much cheaper but more com-
plex, is to use Commercial of The Shelf Components
(COTS) connected with system redundancy and safety
algorithms. Protective algorithms can by used on hard-
ware layer (for example embedded inside FPGA chips)
or on software one. The authors decided to implement
SEU-tolerant algorithms inside the sCore operating sys-
tem kernel. The sCore is designed to work with stan-
dard computer architecture such as PC computers or
embedded versions used by industry. There is known
many frameworks and libraries supporting fault tolerant
environments but this approach requires good knowl-
edge about SEUs nature from application programmers.
Other approach is to use a special kernel version with
embedded protection algorithms which allows to develop
and run applications not able to tolerate SEUs.
2 THE SCORE KERNEL
The sCore is multitasking preemptive kernel based
on the microkernel architecture [11]. It is design to work
on IA-32 architecture (standard PC platform and also
embedded industrial computers) but thanks to C++ ab-
straction layer sCore code could be translated to dif-
ferent platforms (there are plans to port on ARM and
PowerPC architectures). The sCore can by used to
develop real-time applications with a constant time of
tasks switching. The sCore has built in Round Robin
scheduler with 256 priority levels queue. All internal
structures are static and initialised during system boot-
strap. This technique ensures stability and predictable
time dependences. Dynamic memory allocation inside
kernel are not served by kernel.
2.1 The EDAC Task
Radiation tolerant sCore should provide mechanism
to find and correct bit-flip errors inside memory. Static
Random Access Memory (SRAM) technology, used to
develop fast buffers memory and registers, is suscepti-
ble to the SEU effects. Dynamic Random Access Mem-
ory (DRAM), payload for the large main system mem-
ory, is also sensitivity to the SEU effect. Soft errors
inside memory can break the system down. To protect
system memory special task, called EDAC Task, was
implemented. The EDAC Task (fig. 1) divides system












































Figure 1: EDAC Task and memory organisation
scheme.
The first memories region is used to work by sys-
tem (sCore kernel) and running applications. The sec-
ond and third part of memory are used exclusively by
EDAC Task for storage copy of read-only data from the
first memory region. Read-only data (machine codes
and constant variables) are organized by linker to spe-
cial program section called text section. When system
is started EDAC Task copies text section of kernel and
all application into the second and third memory region.
During system operation EDAC Task periodically com-
pare the first and second memory region. If EDAC Task
find a difference between the first and second memory
parts it will compare all three memory regions to choose
the correct one and restore first memory region using
voting technique. The EDAC Task is run periodically
and simultaneously to other applications.
3 EXPERIMENTS WITH THE
SCORE KERNEL
There were carried out two experiments with the
sCore kernel run on the standard PC computer. PC
computer was placed near neutron source (fig. 2). The
first experiment was done with the 241AmBe neutron
source and the second was done inside Liniac2 accelera-
tors tunnel near the electron-positron converter. IArad-
Sim [12], special version of Bochs IA-32 architecture em-
ulator was used to simulate kernel sensitivity to SEU
before experiments. The standard PC computer with
Pentium III 500MHz processor and 128 MB of RAM
memory was used for experiments. Apart from EDAC
Task, two other application was run on the sCore. The
first application was simple shell and the second was
MD5 calculation application. MD5 algorithm was cho-
sen to calculate MD5 sum for a initialised memory re-
gion. MD5 application was run in infinite loop and cal-
culated value was compared with a constant value cal-
culated during kernel compilation. If MD5 sum equals a
constant it means that there was not any error in mem-
ory or errors were corrected by EDAC Task.
3.1 Radiation environment around the
241AmBe
The 241AmBe izotop was used as a neutrons source
(fig. 2). The 241AmBe was placed inside the water mod-
erator to slow down neutrons (thermal neutrons gener-




Figure 2: Experiment with 241AmBe.
The experiment was conducted during 22 hours. Sys-
tem activity during experiment is shown in fig. 3. There
was nine errors (SEUs) in memory (level 6 and 4 in fig
3). All errors were corrected by EDAC Task. Only one
SEU was detected by MD5 application and was not cor-



































(4) MD5 app error
(5) MD5 app finished
(6) EDAC Task error
(7) EDAC Task finished
Figure 3: System activity diagram during experiment
with 241AmBe.
3.2 Radiation environment inside the
Liniac2 tunnel
Liniac2 accelerator is used for experiments inside
tunnel because of VUV-FEL and X-FEL accelerators
are still under development. The computer with sCore
system was installed close to the electron-positron con-
verter (fig. 4). Electron-positron converter generates
positrons for physic experiments but also gamma and
neutrons are generated as a parasitic effect. There was
done two experiments inside Liniac2. The first experi-
ment was done during 26 hours and the second takes 24
hours. When the electron-positron converter was turned
on, neutron radiation was generated and sCore received
unknown interrupt (see in fig. 5, level 3) number 13.
Interrupt number 13 is called General Fault by Intel
nomenclature. The sCore kernel was not able to work
inside Liniac2 tunnel when the electron-positron con-
verter was running.
4 CURRENT AND FUTURE WORK
The current work is focused on the advantage of vir-
tual memory management provided by modern proces-
sors. Instead of scanning all system memory (the first
memory region scanned by EDAC Task) all memory
pages has set dirty bit which means that every access
to the memory generates interrupt. The ISR procedure
which serve interrupt compares demanded pages with
its copy and clears dirty bit. This technique is faster
and more effective then EDAC Task but it still requires
memory redundancy for keeping working copies. More
sophisticated technique is to use hardware debugging











































(0) System restarted by watchdog
(2) System initialization
(3) Interrupt
(4) MD5 app error
(5) MD5 app finished
(6) EDAC Task error
(7) EDAC Task finished
Figure 5: System activity diagram during experiment
inside the Liniac2 tunnel.
debug mode is implementing inside sCore kernel. Using
debug mode is possible to run application step by step
and it is easy to watch every access to the memory cell.
Moreover, sCore with built in debug mode service will
be able to repeat every process instruction three times
and compare results (this technique is based on transac-
tion mechanism). Therefore sCore should be ported to
the other architecture (such as ARM and PowerPC) to
cooperate with many types of microprocessors systems
and embedded computers.
5 CONCLUSION
During experiments it was possible to observe be-
haviour of PC architecture under neutron radiation im-
pact. Experiment with the 241AmBe shown that sim-
ple redundant technique (EDAC Task) can protect user
application and prevent SEUs influence on the system
memory. On the other hand, because of high radia-
tion level, experiment inside Liniac2 tunnel close to the
electron-positron converter shown that EDAC Task is
almost useless. When the electron-positron converter
was working average six SEUs events per second inside
memory was observed. Neutrons intensity inside Liniac2
caused errors not only in main memory but also in pro-
cessors registers. The EDAC Task can be useful only
for weak radiation environment. The future work will
focus on fault tolerant technique to protect micropro-
cessor system from high radiation level comparable to
the radiation generated by electron-positron converter.
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